



OakridgeMUN 2025

Chapter XV



UNITED NATIONS COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE

*“Strengthening Global Counter-Terrorism
Cooperation to Tackle Cross Border
Milantancy and State-sponsored Terror
networks with special focus on the
Pahalgam Attack”*

Research Guide

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I. Letter from the Executive Board

Greetings Delegates!

It gives us immense pleasure to welcome you all to this simulation of the **United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee (UNCTC)** at ‘**Oakridge Model United Nations 2025**’. We look forward to an enriching and rewarding experience.

The agenda for the session is: ***“Strengthening Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation to Tackle Cross Border Militancy and State-sponsored Terror networks with special focus on the Pahalgam Attack.”***

This study guide is by no means the end of the research, we would very much appreciate it if the members are able to find new realms in the agenda and bring it forth to the committee. Such research combined with good argumentation and a solid representation of facts is what makes an excellent performance.

In the session, the executive board will encourage you to speak as much as possible, as fluency, diction, or oratory skills have very little importance as opposed to the content you deliver. So prime emphasis on research is recommended.

The Executive Board looks forward to an efficient & progressive committee as the issue is very sensitive. We, therefore, expect you all to play your roles with responsibility. Hopefully we, as members of the Executive Board, will also have a chance to gain insight from this committee.

All the best!

Regards,

Aaditya Wadhwa
Chairperson

Naren Ayinala
Vice-Chairperson

Rishith Reddy
Rapporteur

II. Suggested Pattern For Researching

To start researching on the agenda of the committee, participating members should do the following:

1. Start researching your respective countries and its geopolitics. As no definite document may be found which contains the stand of a country, the delegates must do the tedious yet rewarding work of going through past news clippings/ magazine articles/ government websites/ social media handles/ YouTube videos to understand the country's stance on the said agenda.
2. After gaining knowledge about the portfolios, the delegates must start their research on the agenda at hand. This must be done by researching further upon the agenda using the footnotes and links given in the guide and from other sources such as academic papers, institutional or governmental reports, national reports, news articles, blogs etc.
3. Characterize the agenda into sub-topics and prepare speeches and statements on them. The delegates should also prepare a list of possible solutions and actions the UNCTC can suggest/adopt on the issue.
4. Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of information/ allegation you are going to use in committee and keep your research updated using various news sources, specifically government studies or data released by the same.
5. To have an edge in the committee in terms of debate, delegates must also research about the other countries and try to find their contradictory statements or controversial stands on various issues to raise allegations/ substantial questions in the committee.
6. Lastly, we would expect all the delegates to put in serious efforts in research and preparation for the simulation and work hard to make it a fruitful learning experience for all. Feel free to contact the undersigned if you have any queries or doubts.

III. Committee Overview

About UNCTC

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN) and is charged with ensuring international peace and security, recommending the admission of new UN members to the General Assembly, and approving any changes to the UN Charter. Its powers as outlined in the United Nations Charter include establishing peacekeeping operations, enacting international sanctions, and authorizing military action. The UNSC is the only UN body with authority to issue resolutions that are binding on member states.

The **Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)** is a subsidiary body of the United Nations Security Council.

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted **Resolution 1373**, which, among its provisions, obliges all States to criminalize assistance for terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists and share information about groups planning terrorist attacks.

The 15-member Counter-Terrorism Committee was established at the same time to monitor implementation of the resolution. While the ultimate aim of the committee is to increase the ability of States to fight terrorism, it is not a sanctions body nor does it maintain a list of terrorist groups or individuals.

While the Counter-Terrorism Committee is not a direct capacity provider it does act as a broker between those states or groups that have the relevant capacities and those in the need of assistance.

Seeking to revitalize the committee's work, in 2004 the Security Council adopted **Resolution 1535**, creating the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to provide the CTC with expert advice on all areas covered by resolution 1373. CTED was established also with the aim of facilitating technical assistance to countries, as well as promoting closer cooperation and coordination both within the UN system of organizations and among regional and intergovernmental bodies.

Composition

The Committee is composed of 15 Member States:

Please note that the year mentioned within brackets indicates the last year the country is a non-permanent member of the Security Council.


Algeria (2025)
 China
 Denmark (2026)
 France
 Greece (2026)
 Guyana (2025)
 Pakistan (2026)
 Panama (2026)
 Republic of Korea (2025)
 Russian Federation
 Sierra Leone (2025)
 Slovenia (2025)
 Somalia (2026)
 United Kingdom
 United States

Mandate

The core function of the UNCTC is to monitor Member States' implementation of Security Council-mandated counter-terrorism measures, and to facilitate capacity-building and international cooperation.

The Committee's mandate includes:

- ❖ Ensuring compliance with Resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent relevant UNSC resolutions.
- ❖ Assessing national counter-terrorism frameworks (legal, institutional, and operational).
- ❖ Identifying technical assistance needs of Member States.
- ❖ Promoting the adoption and implementation of international legal instruments related to terrorism.
- ❖ Encouraging regional and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
- ❖ Addressing issues related to the prevention of terrorist financing, border security, criminal justice cooperation, and law enforcement practices.



Veto Power

Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, Security Council decisions on all substantive matters require the affirmative votes of nine (i.e. three-fifths) of the members. A negative vote or a "veto" by a permanent member prevents adoption of a proposal, even if it has received the required votes. Abstention is not regarded as a veto in most cases, though all five permanent members must vote for adopting any amendment of the UN Charter. Procedural matters cannot be vetoed, so the veto right cannot be used to avoid discussion of an issue. The same holds for certain non-binding decisions that directly regard permanent members. Most vetoes have been used for blocking a candidate for Secretary-General or the admission of a member state, not in critical international security situations.

IV. Introduction

In an era marked by increasing geopolitical instability, global peace and security are not mere aspirations — they are the bedrock of human progress and collective survival. As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi aptly stated during the BRICS Session on Peace and Security,

"Terrorism today poses the gravest threat to humanity,"¹

and its impact is not confined by national borders. The heinous terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22 was not just an affront to India's sovereignty, but a strike against the shared values of peace, dignity, and human decency. In the face of such atrocities, international solidarity must transcend political convenience; condemnation of terrorism must be principled, not selective.

The message is clear: terrorism and its enablers must be decisively isolated, and peace must be pursued through dialogue, trust, and multilateral cooperation.

This UNCTC aims to examine the rising tensions between India and Pakistan, focusing on the Pahalgam terror attack and its regional implications. Analyzing the role of the United States and exploring how the UN Security Council can intervene effectively.

The world must act now, to uphold peace, justice, and international security.




¹Source: PM Narendra Modi, BRICS Session on Peace and Security, 6 July 2025

V. Historical Background

The history between India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, is inextricably linked. The countries have fought a series of wars since gaining their independence from Great Britain in 1947, largely over the Kashmir region, to which both countries lay claim.

India became a nuclear power in 1974, and Pakistan became a nuclear power in 1998.

Neither country has used nuclear weapons in conflict, but many experts fear that the ongoing crisis could escalate beyond conventional weapons use.



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² <https://armscontrolcenter.org/history-of-conflict-in-india-and-pakistan/>

Here is a brief history of the conflict between the two countries—

August 1947:

Following the end of British rule, British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan. The provincial division was based on Hindu and Muslim majorities, which caused mass migration for those that did not live in the majorities. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in communal violence resulting in an atmosphere of hostility that has remained for decades. The Jammu and Kashmir regions have been disputed since partition, with Pakistan and India both claiming ownership.

October 1947 – January 1949:

The first Indo-Pakistani war began following an invasion of Kashmir by armed forces (disguised as tribesmen) from Pakistan. Kashmir turned to India for military assistance and in return agreed to hand over powers of defense, communication and foreign affairs, acceding to India. A ceasefire was arranged on Jan. 1, 1949 and a ceasefire line was established – now called the **Line of Control (LoC)**.

August 1965:

The second Indo-Pakistani war was sparked by a series of clashes across the India-Pakistani border. Hostilities broke out in August when Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control into Indian-administered Kashmir in an attempt to start an insurgency against India (Operation Gibraltar). The war ended in January 1966 when officials from India and Pakistan signed a declaration affirming their commitment to peace.

December 1971:

When India and Pakistan became their own countries, Pakistan was split into two parts – East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The third Indo-Pakistani war took place when Pakistan erupted into civil war, pitting West Pakistan against East Pakistan, who demanded independence. Millions of east Pakistanis fled to India, and quickly the West Pakistani army surrendered. East Pakistan earned independence on Dec. 6, 1971 and changed its name to Bangladesh.

May 1974:

India successfully tested its first nuclear weapon, code named “Operation Smiling Buddha.” It took place on the army base Pokhran Test Range, close to its border with Pakistan.

July 1989:

Armed resistance against Indian rule began in Kashmir when Muslim parties complained that the 1987 elections were rigged against them. Some citizens allegedly demanded independence while others wanted a union with Pakistan. Pakistan supported the movement, calling for the issue to be resolved by the United Nations. India called for Pakistan to end cross-border terrorism. Since 1989, several new radical Islamist groups have emerged, shifting the movement from a nationalistic and secularist one to an Islamic one. The insurgency has continued until present day.

May 1998:

India and Pakistan both conducted nuclear tests. India's underground nuclear test was conducted near its border with Pakistan. In response, Pakistan conducted six tests. The international community condemned India and Pakistan for the testing, and urged the two nations to stop their nuclear weapons programs.

May 1998:

India adopted a No First Use (NFU) policy, meaning the state would not use nuclear weapons unless it was attacked with a nuclear weapon first. Despite questions around the policy, India remains faithful to the NFU doctrine.

May 1999:

For the first time in almost three decades, India was compelled to launch decisive air strikes against Pakistani intruders who had illegally occupied strategic heights in Indian-administered Kashmir. As the confrontation escalated, drawing both nuclear-armed nations to the brink of full-scale war, Pakistan placed its troops on high alert. Over 38,000 civilians on Pakistan's side of the Line of Control were forced to abandon their homes amid rising tensions.

December 2001:

Five armed terrorists entered the Indian Parliament building and opened fire, killing nine people. Pakistani-backed militants were found responsible for the attack, which led to a massive buildup of troops along with Indo-Pakistani border.

February 2007:

Blasts in two coaches of the Samjhauta Express killed 68 people, most of them Pakistani nationals. The train was created in 1994 as a goodwill measure to help families who were separated during the 1947 India-Pakistan partition. This came at a time when relations were improving between India and Pakistan.

November 2008:

Ten Pakistani men associated with the terror group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba stormed various buildings in Mumbai and killed 164 people using automatic weapons and grenades. Only one of the 10 gunmen (Ajmal Kasab) survived, and was executed in 2012.

September 2016:

Following the brutal terrorist attack on an Indian Army base in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, which claimed the lives of 19 soldiers, India responded with calibrated military precision. On the night of September 28–29, Indian special forces carried out surgical strikes across the Line of Control, targeting multiple terrorist launch pads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. This decisive action marked a pivotal shift in India's counter-terror policy, signaling to the world that cross-border terrorism would be met with direct, proportionate, and resolute retaliation. The strikes demonstrated India's growing strategic confidence and reinforced its commitment to defending national sovereignty.

February 2019:

Pakistani-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed carried out a suicide car bomb attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir which resulted in the deaths of over 40 members of India's paramilitary forces. India retaliated with air strikes across the Line of Control, and Pakistan shot down an Indian aircraft and captured a pilot. These actions significantly increased tensions between the two nuclear states but two days later, the Indian pilot was released and tensions relaxed.

May 2025:

Following an April 22 terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that killed 26 civilians, India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, using cruise missiles against alleged terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Pakistan responded by launching conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles and heavy mortar shells on Poonch, killing civilians and damaging homes. The crisis featured the first drone-on-drone exchanges between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

Heavy air and missile strikes continued through May 9–10, including Indian strikes on Pakistani airbases and a Pakistani operation targeting Indian military installations. Both countries claimed tactical success amidst heavy disinformation. A U.S.-mediated ceasefire took effect on May 10, ending the four-day flare-up.



VI. Pahalgam Terror Attack

The 2025 Pahalgam attack was a terrorist attack on tourists by five armed terrorists near Pahalgam in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir in which 26 civilians were killed on 22 April 2025. The militants mainly targeted Hindu tourists, though a Christian tourist and a local Muslim were also killed. The attackers, armed with M4 carbines and AK-47s, entered the tourist spot in Baisaran Valley surrounded by dense pine forests. This incident is the deadliest attack on civilians in India since the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

On 22 April 2025, five militants entered the Baisaran Valley meadow, which is located about 7 km (4.3 mi) from the Pahalgam town in Anantnag district. The area is surrounded by dense pine forests on all sides, and is a popular spot for tourists; it is only accessible by foot or horseback. The region was not heavily protected. The attackers carried M4 carbines and AK-47s and wore military-style uniforms.

The attack was inadvertently filmed by a tourist from Ahmedabad, who was ziplining during the attack. The video footage from the scene showed scenes of panic with injured victims pleading for help and bodies strewn across the ground. A local Muslim pony operator, Syed Adil Hussain Shah reportedly tried to protect the tourists and wrestle the gun from one of the attackers before being shot and killed.

The Resistance Front (TRF), which is believed to be an offshoot of Pakistan-based, UN-designated, Islamist terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), initially claimed responsibility for the attack. TRF released a statement that the attack was in opposition to non-local settlement in the region resulting from the abolition of the special status of Kashmir. After a few days, TRF denied its involvement in the attack. Previously, TRF has claimed responsibility for several attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir targeting religious minorities.

The militants singled out the men and asked for their religion before shooting the Hindu and Christian tourists. The attackers also asked some tourists to recite the Islamic kalima, a Muslim declaration of faith, to identify non-Muslims. Of the 26 people killed, 25 were tourists, and one was a local Muslim pony ride operator who tried to wrestle a gun from the attackers. The tourists included several newlywed couples, and the men were shot point-blank in front of their wives.



Baisaran Valley

Aftermath

In the aftermath, locals assisted in the rescue effort and offered shelter to victims. Members of the local pony-handlers association rescued 11 injured tourists on ponies and improvised stretchers. Gurudwaras in Kashmir opened their doors to shelter tourists fleeing the valley in fear, as many sought safety closer to cities and airports to return to their home states. Emergency services arrived at the scene after news of the attack reached district headquarters. Two critically injured victims were taken to the district hospital at Anantnag at around 16:30, while others were transported to nearby medical centres. The critically injured were airlifted to a military hospital in Srinagar by helicopter for further treatment. A helpline was established to assist affected tourists.

A joint cordon and search operation was launched by the Indian Army, paramilitary forces, and Jammu and Kashmir Police. A temporary lockdown was imposed in Pahalgam, and Indian Army helicopters were deployed to track down the militants, who reportedly fled to the upper reaches of the Pir Panjal range.

On 24 April, an Indian soldier was killed and two other soldiers wounded during a gunfight with insurgents in the Basantgarh area of Udampur.

Authorities conducted extensive searches in Indian-administered Kashmir, detaining more than 1,500 people for questioning. They also demolished the houses of the families of at least 10 suspected militants.

On 17 June, in a statement, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) noted that the Pahalgam terrorist attack could not have occurred without financial resources and the ability to move funds between terrorist supporters.



CONSULATE GENERAL OF INDIA
TORONTO

The timeline of Pahalgam terror attack

22nd April, 2025: Attack on innocent tourists in Pahalgam, J&K, India

The heinous terrorist attack killed 25 Indians and one Nepali citizen. A number of others sustained injuries. Pakistan-based The Resistance Front (TRF), a Lashkar-e-Taiba front, claimed responsibility for the attack.

23rd April, 2025: India reacts with counter-measures

- a) Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 held in abeyance
- b) Integrated Check Post Attari closed
- c) SVES visas to Pakistani nationals cancelled
- d) Diplomatic strength downsized

25th April, 2025: Pakistan's duplicity at UNSC

Pakistan opposed TRF's mention at the UNSC, exposing Pakistan's double standards. The UNSC on 25th April 2025 had issued a Press Statement on the Pahalgam terror attack, underlining 'the need to hold perpetrators, organisers, financiers and sponsors of this reprehensible act of terrorism accountable and bring them to justice.'

07th May, 2025: India's retaliation and strike at cross-border terrorist infrastructure

After no demonstrable step from Pakistan to take action against the terrorist infrastructure on its territory or on territory under its control and an advanced intel of another impending terrorist attack, India retaliated in a precise, non-escalatory and targeted manner after 15 days of Pahalgam terrorist attack and struck at cross-border terrorist infrastructure under 'Operation Sindoor.'

07th May, 2025: Pakistan's unprovoked firing across the Line of Control

Pakistan increased the intensity of its unprovoked firing across the Line of Control using Mortars and heavy calibre Artillery in which 16 innocent lives were lost, including three women and five children.

08th May, 2025: Pakistani drones target Indian military stations

Pakistani origin drones and missiles targeted Indian military stations at Jammu, Pathankot and Udhampur. The threats were swiftly neutralised.

VII. India's Response

(14 MAY 2025 8:53PM by PIB Delhi)

On April 22, terror struck Pahalgam. Pakistan-backed attackers stormed a village, asked people their religion, and killed them, resulting in 26 deaths. A clear attempt to incite communal violence, this marked a shift, from cross-border attacks to dividing India from within. In response, India launched Operation SINDOOR to destroy the terror bases behind the attack. But Pakistan hit back harder. Over the next week, it used drones and shelling to target religious sites. The Shambhu Temple in Jammu, the Gurdwara in Poonch, and Christian convents were attacked. These were not random strikes. They were part of a plan to break India's unity.



Purpose of Operation SINDOOR:

- Conceived to punish perpetrators and planners of terror
- Aimed to destroy terror infrastructure across the border

Intelligence and Target Selection:

- Carried out a microscopic scan of the terror landscape
- Identified numerous terror camps and training sites

Operational Ethics and Restraint:

- Operated under self-imposed restraint to avoid collateral damage
- Only terrorist targets were to be neutralized, avoiding civilian harm

During the first press briefing on May 7, India clarified its response as focused, measured and non-escalatory. It was specifically mentioned that Pakistani military establishments had not been targeted. It was also reiterated that any attack on military targets in India will invite a suitable response. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, across multiple press briefings on May 8, 9, and 10, laid bare India's plan of action and the full extent of Pakistan's designs.

India's Retaliatory Response: India conducted retaliatory strikes on Radar installations in Lahore and Radar facilities near Gurjanwala destroyed.

Ceasefire: Inflicted by this heavy damage, Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) called the Indian DGMO and It was agreed between them that both sides would stop all firing and military action on land and in the air and sea with effect from 1700 hours Indian Standard Time on 10th May 2025.

Pakistani Response after ceasefire: Even after ceasefire, Wave of UAVs and small drones intruded into Indian civilian and military areas. These drones were successfully intercepted.


The Indian Armed Forces gave a befitting response to Pakistan's intrusion. Further, all field commanders have been authorized to take appropriate action in case of any ceasefire violation.

Additionally, being in the digital age, warfare transcends traditional battlegrounds. Alongside military operations, a fierce information war has been ongoing online. Following the commencement of Operation SINDOOR, India found itself targeted by an aggressive campaign launched by Pakistan- full of lies and misinformation. The aim was to distort the truth, mislead the global public and reclaim lost narrative ground through a storm of misinformation. However, India has been proactively responding and dissipating misinformation with facts, transparency, showcasing strong digital vigilance. Rather than reacting emotionally, a composed and methodical approach to information warfare was undertaken:

- Highlighting operational success: Operation SINDOOR's effectiveness was communicated with precision, focusing on strategic outcomes rather than sensationalism.
- Discrediting sources: Indian authorities have exposed the manipulation tactics used by Pakistan-based accounts, many of which are now under scrutiny by international social media platforms.
- Promoting media literacy: Campaigns to educate citizens on how to identify fake news have helped create a more resilient digital environment.

Pakistan Punished Through Military and Non-Military Means

Operation SINDOOR was a significant demonstration of India's military and strategic power, executed through a combination of military and non-military means. This multi-dimensional operation effectively neutralized terrorist threats, deterred Pakistani aggression, and firmly enforced India's zero-tolerance policy towards terrorism. The operation maintained strategic restraint while gaining international support.



Chapter XV



Military Measures

India carried out several precise and well-planned military actions to achieve its objectives.

The Indian Armed Forces launched coordinated and accurate missile strikes on 9 terrorist bases—4 located in Pakistan (including Bahawalpur and Muridke) and 5 in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (such as Muzaffarabad and Kotli). These locations were key command centers of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), responsible for major attacks like Pulwama (2019) and Mumbai (2008).

In retaliation to Pakistani drone and missile attacks on Indian cities and military bases on May 7, 8, and 9, 2025, India deployed kamikaze drones with the objective of neutralizing Pakistan's air defense capabilities, including disabling Lahore's air defense system.

India's air defense systems successfully intercepted all incoming threats, resulting in minimal loss of life or property. In contrast, Pakistan's HQ-9 air defense system was exposed as weak. On the night of May 9 and 10, 2025, India's counteroffensive became a historic milestone when, for the first time, a country successfully attacked the air bases of a nuclear-armed nation.

Within just three hours, India targeted 11 military installations including Noor Khan, Rafiqui, Murid, Sukkur, Sialkot, Pasrur, Chunian, Sargodha, Skardu, Bholari, and Jacobabad.

Satellite images before and after the strike on Shahbaz Airbase in Jacobabad clearly show the scale of destruction.

The attack targeted major ammunition depots and airbases such as Sargodha and Bholari, where F-16 and JF-17 fighter jets were stationed. As a result, nearly 20% of Pakistan's air force infrastructure was destroyed.

Over 50 individuals, including Squadron Leader Usman Yusuf and 4 airmen, were killed in the bombing of Bholari Airbase. Several Pakistani fighter jets were also destroyed.

Under Operation Sindoor, India executed precise strikes on several terrorist hubs and military facilities in Pakistan.

After Pakistani artillery and mortar attacks targeted civilian areas in the Poonch-Rajouri sector along the Line of Control, Indian forces retaliated, destroying terrorist bunkers and Pakistani army positions that were targeting civilians.

A half-burnt photograph of Asif Ali Zardari recovered from the smoldering debris of Rahimyar Khan Airbase symbolized the destruction of Pakistan's international image.

Non-Military Measures undertaken:

- India's non-kinetic efforts played a crucial role in shaping the strategic environment and ensuring public and international support. Through strategic policymaking, information dominance, and psychological operations, India diplomatically and economically isolated Pakistan while strengthening domestic preparedness and global backing.
- A decisive move under Operation SINDOOR was India's termination of the Indus Waters Treaty. The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 will be held in abeyance with immediate effect, until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism. This has far-reaching consequences for Pakistan, a country heavily dependent on the Indus river system for 80% of its 16 million hectares of agricultural land and 93% of its total water use. This system supports 237 million people and contributes one-fourth of Pakistan's GDP through crops like wheat, rice, and cotton.
- With Mangla and Tarbela dams having only 10% live storage capacity (14.4 MAF), any disruption in water flow could cause catastrophic agricultural losses, food shortages, water rationing in major cities, and rolling blackouts. Industries such as textiles and fertilizers could become paralyzed. These shocks would severely impact Pakistan's already fragile economy, pushing it toward fiscal and foreign exchange crises.
- For India, the Indus Waters Treaty had long hampered infrastructure development in Jammu & Kashmir, restricting projects to run-of-the-river designs. Suspension of the treaty gave India full control over western rivers like Jhelum and Chenab, enabling construction of new reservoirs in Jammu & Kashmir, Ladakh, Punjab, and Haryana. This boosted irrigation and hydroelectric power generation and transformed a diplomatic instrument into a developmental asset. By suspending the treaty, India sent a decisive message- "Blood and water cannot flow together."
- India closed the Attari-Wagah border. The Integrated Check Post Attari was closed with immediate effect. Those who crossed over with valid endorsements were to return through that route before 01 May 2025. India also suspended all bilateral trade with Pakistan. It halted exports of key goods like onions and banned imports of cement and textiles. This action severed the primary land-based trade route between the two nations, causing major disruption in economic ties.
- This suspension imposed immediate economic pressure on Pakistan, which was already battling inflation and debt crises. By cutting off these economic lifelines without escalating direct military conflict, India reinforced its zero-tolerance stance.
- Demonstrating firm resolve against terrorism, India revoked visas of all Pakistanis residing in the country and deported them immediately after the


Pahalgam terrorist attack. Pakistani nationals will not be permitted to travel to India under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme (SVES) visas.

- A total ban was imposed on Pakistani artists, suspending all performances, screenings, music releases, and cultural exchanges. This restriction extended to streaming platforms, effectively erasing Pakistan's cultural influence in India.
- On the global stage, India exposed Pakistan's terror infrastructure and diplomatically isolated it.
- Collectively, these actions inflicted severe economic and diplomatic damage on Pakistan. They deepened its international isolation while powerfully affirming India's commitment to a zero-tolerance policy against terrorism.
- The Defence/Military, Naval and Air Advisors in the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi are declared Persona Non Grata. The overall strength of the High Commissions will be brought down to 30 from the present 55 through further reductions.



VIII. Global Intervention

After the hostilities concluded, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that he had successfully persuaded both India and Pakistan to agree to a ceasefire. To that end, he asserted that he had threatened to impose significant trade sanctions on both countries, thereby inducing them to end the ongoing hostilities.



Pakistan lauded his public remarks and even briefly nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. (After Trump's decision to attack three nuclear facilities in Iran, Pakistan's political opposition asked its government to rescind the nomination.) India, for its part, has repeatedly and categorically denied that the ceasefire was a product of Trump's intervention.

Before Trump proclaimed his role in ending the brief, intense conflict, Vice President J.D. Vance had stated that the India-Pakistan crisis was "none of our business." Trump subsequently claimed the U.S. acted as mediator in defusing India-Pakistan tensions.



Finally, to New Delhi's dismay, Trump decided to host General Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army's chief of staff, for lunch at the White House. Although little of substance emerged from the meeting, the optics were a source of considerable misgiving in New Delhi.

Several Indian political analysts and commentators have argued that Trump's statements and actions suggest a return to the much-disliked U.S. policy of *hyphenation*: linking India and Pakistan in its dealings with the two antagonistic neighbors. Indeed, this had characterized U.S. policy toward the subcontinent during much of the Cold War.

It was only under the late U.S. Ambassador Frank Wisner in the mid-1990s that Washington decided to de-hyphenate its relations with the two countries. Wisner, who served as the ambassador to New Delhi between 1994 and 1997, was able to pursue this strategy because of India's growing economic clout in the wake of its fitful embrace of economic liberalization in 1991. Subsequent administrations, for the most part, adhered to this policy.

Even after the renewal of a Pakistan-U.S. security relationship following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, Washington maintained a cordial and mostly robust relationship with India. The India-U.S. partnership even survived Secretary of State Colin Powell's maladroitness designation of Pakistan as a "major non-NATO ally" in 2004, despite causing its share of unease in New Delhi.

What, in considerable part, redeemed the India-U.S. relationship was President George W. Bush's monumental decision in 2005 to pursue the India-U.S. civilian nuclear accord. This accord, for all practical purposes, exempted India from the strictures of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 and allowed it to maintain its nuclear weapons program. All prior U.S. presidents had, to varying degrees, sought to cajole, persuade and even browbeat India to eschew its nuclear weapons program and accede to the NPT.

Bush's decision to make an exception for India amounted to what scholars of international relations refer to as a "costly signal" — namely, one that requires the expenditure of significant domestic and international political capital. In its wake, India-U.S. relations had been placed on a far more secure footing.

Subsequent administrations, both Democratic and Republican, steadily built upon the solid foundations that Bush had constructed during his second term in office. The Barack Obama administration, for example, during its first year in office, neglected India. However, Obama visited India in 2010. During the visit, much to the surprise of his interlocutors in New Delhi, in a speech to the Indian Parliament he publicly stated that-

the United States, at some point, would look forward to including New Delhi as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

Since this was a long-standing Indian goal, his announcement came as a very pleasant surprise to the Indian political leadership.

Also, at the initiative of then-Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, the administration designated India as a “Major Defense Partner,” thereby easing defense acquisitions from the United States.

Even the advent of the first Trump administration did not lead to substantial policy changes. India, it appeared, had for all practical purposes become a mostly bipartisan issue. The Joe Biden administration, despite expressing some misgivings about democratic backsliding and human rights in India, continued to deepen and broaden the strategic partnership, especially because of its concerns about an increasingly assertive, if not downright revanchist, China in Asia.

Trump’s return to office in 2025, however, has seen some disturbing signs, largely because of his propensity to use trade as a weapon or at least a source of leverage. Unlike in the past, perhaps cognizant of Trump’s inclination to exploit the trade deficit with India as a political blunderbuss, the Modi government indicated a willingness to make certain trade concessions. These trade negotiations, though initially promising, have yet to result in an accord.

Meanwhile, Trump’s maladroitness remarks and his hosting of General Munir have cast a pall on the India-U.S. relationship. It is, of course, possible that New Delhi is needlessly tying itself in knots about these ill-advised statements from the White House. They may simply reflect Trump’s proclivity for self-aggrandizement and a degree of policy incoherence.

That said, given Trump’s mercurial disposition, New Delhi’s concerns about the future of the relationship may well be understandable. Much of the progress that has been achieved in India-U.S. relations could suffer a setback owing to Trump’s ill-advised remarks.

IX. Legal Aspect of the Conflict

The UN Charter, particularly Article 2(4), prohibits the use of force against a state's territorial integrity or political independence, a peremptory norm of international law. Exceptions exist under Article 51, which permits self-defence in response to an “armed attack,” and Chapter VII, which allows UN Security Council-authorized force.

India justifies ‘Operation Sindoor’ under Article 51, arguing that the Pahalgam attack, supported by Pakistan, constitutes an armed attack. In the case of *US v. Nicaragua*, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) clarified that an armed attack by non-state actors must be of “sufficient gravity” and attributable to a state to trigger self-defence. India asserts that Pakistan's backing of Lashkar-e-Taiba meets this threshold.

Defining Aggression and its Response

UNGA Resolution 3314 (1974) defines aggression and establishes that the first unlawful use of force gives rise to a presumption of aggression. India alleges that Pakistan's sponsorship of LeT proxies satisfies this threshold.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL), codified in the Geneva Conventions, governs the conduct of armed conflicts. Key principles include:

- Distinction: Parties must differentiate between combatants and civilians, targeting only military objectives.
- Proportionality: Attacks must not cause excessive civilian harm relative to the military advantage gained.
- Necessity: Military actions must be limited to achieving legitimate objectives, avoiding unnecessary suffering.

India claims its strikes adhered to these principles, targeting only terrorist camps and minimizing civilian casualties. However, Pakistan's alleged support for terrorism, if proven, could violate IHL and UNGA Resolution 3314, which defines aggression as the use of armed force against another state's sovereignty, including sponsoring armed groups.

India's Justification for Retaliation

In the context of ongoing hostilities, we have to consider Article 53 of UN Charter which states that:

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

This article is widely understood to codify a pre-existing, “inherent right” to self-defence that exists under customary international law, even independent of the Charter itself. A crucial trigger for the lawful exercise of this right under Article 51 is the occurrence of an “armed attack” against a member state.

India justifies its actions in response to the Pahalgam attack based on the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. India argues that the attack, supported by Pakistan-based terrorist groups, constitutes an “armed attack” necessitating a response to protect its security and deter future attacks. India has also emphasized that its actions under “Operation Sindoor” were measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible and targeted against terrorist infrastructure, focusing on dismantling it and not against the common people of Pakistan.

India's Domestic Legal Framework

India's response is guided by its Constitution and military doctrine. Article 355 imposes a duty on the Union to protect states from external aggression. India's evolving military doctrine, shifting from “deterrence by denial” to “deterrence by punishment,” reflects a proactive stance against cross-border terrorism. The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces operate under dynamic Rules of Engagement (ROE), allowing flexibility in response to threats like the Pahalgam attack. The Supreme Court, while typically deferring to the Executive on national security, can review actions to ensure constitutional compliance, particularly regarding fundamental rights.

In a declared war, India's Constitution grants the Union extensive emergency powers under Article 352, including suspending fundamental rights, extending executive control over states, and legislating on state matters. The President, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces under Article 53(2), oversees military operations.

The Indus Waters Treaty Suspension

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was brokered by the World Bank and signed in 1960, allocating water from the Indus River system between India and Pakistan. Following the Pahalgam attack, India put the Treaty in abeyance, suspending its participation, raising concerns about water security for Pakistan which is heavily reliant on the Indus for agriculture and other needs. The importance of the Treaty can be attributed through Pakistan's declaration, calling the suspension an "Act of War." Legally, unilateral suspension without a material breach by Pakistan may violate the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. For India, the suspension will enable to increase hydro-power and control floods over the Western rivers (Jhelum, Chenab, Indus). However, limited infrastructure currently restricts India's ability to fully exploit this advantage.

Nuclear Risks and International Law

India and Pakistan both have nuclear facilities that is a cause of concern. The ICJ's 1996 Advisory Opinion on 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons' found no universal prohibition on their use but noted that such use would generally be contrary to the principles and rules of international humanitarian law due to their indiscriminate effects and potential to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage.

India's Nuclear Policy is centred around the principle of "No First Use" (NFU) and "Credible Minimum Deterrence" in contrast with Pakistan's ambiguous stance, which includes potential use of tactical nuclear weapons to counter conventional threats emerging as a hybrid mix incorporating various elements of NATO's nuclear strategies of "Mutually Assured destruction." In any situation, nuclear escalation by either country would result in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and violation of humanitarian principles.

International Judicial Accountability

The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutes individuals for war crimes, genocide, and aggression, while the ICJ resolves state disputes. India, not a party to the Rome Statute, is outside ICC jurisdiction. Historical precedents, like the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, established accountability for aggressive wars and war crimes committed by individuals who were Axis leaders. The Principle VI established under Nuremberg Trial which was also applied in the Tokyo Trials set out the crimes which were punishable under international law. These include; a) Crimes Against Peace, b) War Crimes, and c) Crimes against Humanity.

Repercussions for Breach of IHL

Under international law, aggression is considered the most serious crime against peace and security. UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 defines “aggression as the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state.” In the context of the ongoing Indo-Pak conflict, Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism could trigger state responsibility under the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (**ARSIWA**), potentially leading to **reparations** (the action of making amends for a wrong one has done, by providing payment or other assistance to those who have been wronged) or sanctions. However, geopolitical divisions, particularly China’s support for Pakistan, limit UN Security Council action.

Bilateral Treaties between India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan have entered into various bilateral agreements over the years, most notable being the Karachi Agreement (1949), Liaquat-Nehru Pact (1950), Indus Water Treaty (1960), Tashkent Declaration (1965), Simla Agreement (1972), Non-nuclear Aggression Agreement (1988) and Lahore Declaration (1999) .

Further, both countries are parties to several global conventions, most notably the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which establish the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law. However, India has not ratified the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, while Pakistan has signed but not ratified Protocol I.

Is Extradition between India and Pakistan Possible

India and Pakistan lack an extradition treaty, complicating efforts to address terrorism. India’s request for Hafiz Saeed’s extradition in 2023 failed because of this. Extradition treaties, governed in India by the Extradition Act, 1962, require dual criminality and a *prima facie* case. Without a treaty, cooperation depends on domestic laws and international norms. Bilateral agreements like the Simla Agreement (1972) and Indus Waters Treaty remain critical, though the latter’s suspension underscores the fragility of such frameworks.

X. Global Repercussions

In the conflict's diplomatic aftermath, India undertook a global campaign to shift international attention toward its counterterrorism concerns, arguing that global narratives were disproportionately focused on nuclear risk rather than the root cause, i.e. cross-border terrorism. As part of this effort, **Indian delegations** visited over 30 capitals, including Washington, London, and Brussels. Conversely, Pakistan launched its own counter-narrative diplomacy, highlighting India's alleged targeting of Sikh religious sites and amplifying the Khalistan separatist issue in international fora.



Tensions also rippled into India's already strained relationship with China. For the first time, Pakistan deployed Chinese fighter jets in live combat against Indian positions, underscoring Beijing's deepening defense ties with Islamabad. This development undercut India's recent efforts to normalize economic relations with China, including easing FDI restrictions and reopening air links. The use of Chinese arms against Indian forces made any continuation of détente politically untenable in New Delhi and signaled to Western capitals the enduring challenge of a China-Pakistan military nexus.

In parallel, the crisis sharpened Indo-Canadian tensions. The Khalistan separatist issue—already a flashpoint between Ottawa and New Delhi—was weaponized online and politically exploited during the conflict. Pro-Khalistan groups voiced support for Pakistan, reigniting India's accusations of Canadian permissiveness toward extremism. Despite this, both countries appear interested in salvaging

commercial ties, with trade being seen as a neutral zone for future cooperation. India also aims to wrap up new trade agreements with key Western allies—including the U.S. and EU—amid a broader diplomatic pivot toward economic statecraft.

Ultimately, the May 2025 Indo-Pak crisis not only redefined the contours of regional warfare, but also reshaped how global powers engage with South Asia's security dilemmas. The fragile ceasefire may have paused open conflict, but the diplomatic, economic, and security reverberations will continue to influence global policy decisions and alliance structures for months, if not years, to come.



XI. UNCTC's Role

In response to the Pahalgam terror attack and subsequent cross-border escalations, the UN Security Council convened **closed-door consultations on May 5**, under Article 34 of the UN Charter, at Pakistan's request and Greece's presidency. During these informal discussions—last seen on Kashmir in 2019, the Council urged both nations to practice “maximum restraint,” promote dialogue, and avoid military confrontation. Secretary-General António Guterres echoed the call, emphasizing that “a military solution is no solution,” acknowledging global concern over the heightened geopolitical tensions.

Although no formal resolution was adopted, Council members pressed Islamabad with “tough questions” regarding Lashkar-e-Taiba's possible involvement in the attack, signaling a firm stance against terrorism rather than politically motivated grandstanding. While no binding resolution emerged, the Council's engagement underscored both the symbolic weight and the structural limitations of its role in South Asia's most enduring and volatile rivalry. Several permanent members, including the U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China, unanimously supported a de-escalatory approach focused on diplomacy and bilateral conflict resolution, rejecting efforts to internationalize the Kashmir dispute.

This UNSC engagement, though informal, revealed two core messages: first, that terrorism, not territorial claims, must remain the global priority; and second, that diplomacy must reign supreme in resolving the conflict, especially between two nuclear-armed neighbors.

Historically, the UNSC has played a restrained yet visible role in India-Pakistan tensions. It possesses several tools to address such crises— chief among them, its ability to convene emergency consultations, issue presidential statements, and, in certain cases, support quiet diplomacy through the UN Secretary-General's good offices. The Council can also condemn terrorist acts, particularly when perpetrators are linked to UN-designated groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, reinforcing international consensus on counterterrorism. In humanitarian contexts, the Council may call for civilian protection or the establishment of relief corridors if hostilities disrupt local populations.

However, the Council's influence in this specific geopolitical context is largely circumscribed by entrenched diplomatic norms and realpolitik. India has consistently rejected third-party mediation on Kashmir, maintaining that all outstanding disputes with Pakistan must be resolved bilaterally in accordance with the Simla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999). Consequently, any

attempt to internationalize the Kashmir issue through the UNSC is diplomatically untenable for New Delhi and unlikely to yield substantive outcomes.

Compounding this is the geopolitical calculus of the Council's permanent members. Both China and Russia, respectively seen as close partners of Pakistan and India, have historically blocked or softened efforts to censure either party. This dynamic, combined with India's strategic and economic weight on the global stage, makes any enforceable UNSC action unlikely.

Nevertheless, the Council retains important symbolic power. Its deliberations can shift the global narrative, amplify diplomatic pressure for de-escalation, and offer neutral ground for informal engagement. As witnessed in the aftermath of the 2025 hostilities, this visibility matters: it can reinforce calls for restraint, highlight the risks of miscalculation between nuclear rivals, and nudge both countries toward crisis management even when formal mediation is off the table.



Pakistan Assumes UN Security Council Presidency for July

Pakistan on July 1st, 2025 assumed the Presidency of the UN Security Council for the month of July. The presidency of the Security Council - the world body's power centre - is part of Pakistan's two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, which began in January 2025.

Pakistan was elected as a non-permanent member with overwhelming support of the UN membership, securing 182 votes out of 193. The Presidency of the UNSC rotates monthly among members alphabetically. During this term, the presiding country sets the agenda, chairs meetings, and facilitates resolutions. While the presidency does not grant veto power or extra voting rights, it allows the country to shape diplomatic narratives on key issues.

Pakistan may attempt to raise issues like Kashmir or project itself as a peace-seeking nation; India is likely to diplomatically counter this.

Pakistan holds both a seat on the Council and a leadership position in the **Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)**. Critics argue its dual role presents a conflict of interest, given accusations of harboring militant groups.



XII. Focus Questions

1. In what ways can the UNCTC balance non-intervention principles with its responsibility to prevent escalation between nuclear-armed states such as India and Pakistan?
2. How can we hold the states accountable for sponsoring or enabling terrorism while respecting their sovereignty and political complexities?
3. Are current UNCTC/UNSC counter-terrorism resolutions (e.g., 1373, 1267) sufficient to address modern terror networks and technologies, or is a structural reform necessary?
4. What targeted diplomatic or economic tools should the UNCTC employ against states or actors found complicit in transnational terrorism?
5. Should the Counter-Terrorism Committee develop new international protocols to address emerging warfare tactics, including drone strikes, cyber-attacks, and proxy conflicts?
6. How can the UNCTC support long-term peacebuilding efforts in Kashmir that prioritize inclusion, de-radicalization, and local engagement?
7. What confidence-building mechanisms can the UNCTC encourage between India and Pakistan to ensure sustained de-escalation and prevent future hostilities?

XIII. List of Valid Sources

1. United Nations Digital Library
2. UN Official Website
3. UN Organs' Websites
4. Past UN Resolutions
5. Government Websites of various Countries