# OakMUN 2025

## UN Security Council


## Agenda: “Discussing measures to restore peace and security in hotspot regions with prolonged instability with emphasis on the situations in Haiti and Myanmar.”

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# Letter from the Executive Board

Dear Delegates!

We are very pleased to welcome you to the simulation of the ***United Nations Security Council*** at ***OakMUN 2025***. It is an honour to serve as your Executive Board for the duration of the conference. This Background Guide is designed to give you an insight into the case at hand, so we hope this acts as only a ***catalyst*** for furthering your research and not limited to just this guide. Please refer to it carefully. Remember, a thorough understanding of the problem is the first step to solving it.

Do understand that this Background Guide is in no way exhaustive and is only meant to provide you with enough background information to establish a platform for beginning the research. Delegates are highly recommended to do a good amount of research beyond what is covered in the Guide.

We understand that MUN conferences can be an overwhelming experience for first-timers but it must be noted that our aspirations from the delegates are not how experienced or articulate they are. Rather, we want to see how one manages the balance to respect differences of opinion and work around this while extending their foreign policy to present comprehensive solutions.

New ideas are by their very nature disruptive, but far less disruptive than a world set against the backdrop of stereotypes and regional instability due to which reform is essential in policy making and conflict resolution. At any point during your research, do not hesitate to contact the Executive Board Members for clarifications or in case you need help in any other aspect. We look forward to a fruitful discussion and an enriching experience with all of you.

***Best regards,***

*Garima Rajpal* *Prabhas Adabala*

***Chairperson*** ***Vice Chairperson***

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# Rules of Procedure

**Roll Call**

At the beginning of each session, the Chair will conduct a roll call to determine the presence of delegates. Delegates may respond with “Present” or “Present and Voting.”. Delegates responding with “Present and Voting” will not be allowed to abstain from voting on substantive matters.

**Formal Debate:**

1) General Speaker’s List (GSL)

This is basically a speech that allows a delegate to present his/her introductory stance on the agenda in the beginning of the committee. It will allow the countries to understand the various standpoints of other countries as we begin with the debate. GSLs have yields that can be used in case of excess remaining time. The default time limit of this speech is 90 seconds.

2) Special Speaker’s List (SSL) - This is a speech which enables a delegate to present his/her country’s stance on a particular topic. It works similar to a GSL while the only difference is stances being on a topic rather than an entire agenda. It has a default time limit of 1 minute 30 seconds (90 seconds). It has all the yields and points similar to a GSL.

**Informal Debate:**

1) Moderated Caucus - These are motions that are used to give specialized speeches on subtopics of the whole agenda. They have a maximum individual speaker’s time limit of 2 min and total time limit of 20 mins. The recommendation for a moderated caucus must include a time limit for delegate remarks and a time limit for the entire caucus. This can also be extended by a time duration that is equal to half the total time limit it was raised for, by proposing a motion to extend.

2) Unmoderated Caucus - This motion allows the delegates to enter an informal session

which the delegates can use for lobbying, documentation and other purposes. This can also be

extended by raising a motion similar to a moderated caucus with only the time limit for the entire caucus.

3) Consultations

To facilitate in-depth discussions, the Committee can incorporate two types of Consultations: Formal Consultations and Informal Consultations. These platforms are designed to provide delegates with the flexibility to discuss specific topics or directives in greater detail.

Formal Consultations will be moderated by the Chair or an appointed moderator, ensuring structured and orderly debate while maintaining decorum. The Chair will oversee the flow of discussions, manage speaking time, and ensure equal opportunities for all delegates to contribute.

Informal Consultations will not be moderated by the Chair, offering a more relaxed and collaborative environment where delegates can engage in free-flowing discussions, form alliances, or brainstorm ideas.

Time limits for both types of Consultations will be determined by a majority vote of the Committee, ensuring adaptability to the needs of the agenda. These sessions provide an excellent forum for delegates to engage in constructive debate, propose working papers, collaborate on ideas, and draft resolutions, serving as a vital tool for driving the progress of the Committee.

**Points and Motions**

- **Point of Personal Privilege:** Raised when a delegate experiences personal discomfort that affects their ability to participate.
- **Point of Order:** Raised when a delegate believes a procedural error has occurred or when another delegate has passed a statement with a factual inaccuracy.
- **Point of Parliamentary Inquiry:** Raised when a delegate wishes to ask a question about the rules or clarify the debate to the Executive Board.

- **Point of Information:** Raised when a delegate wishes to ask a question to another delegate.

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# Hierarchy of evidence

Evidence can be presented from a wide variety of sources, but not all sources are treated as equal. Here's the hierarchy in which evidence is categorised:

***Tier 1*:** Includes any publication, statement, resolution, or document released by any of the Nations' official organs or committees; any publication, statement, or document released by a UN member state in its own capacity. The evidence falling in this tier is considered most reliable during the simulation.

***Tier 2*:** Includes: any news article published by any official media source that is owned and controlled by a UN member state. E.g.: Xinhua News (China), Prasar Bharti (India), BBC (United Kingdom) etcetera. The evidence falling in this tier is considered sufficiently reliable in case no other evidence from any Tier 1 source is available on that particular fact, event, or situation.

***Tier 3*:** Includes: any publication from news sources of international repute such as Reuters, The New York Times, Agence-France Presse, etcetera. The evidence falling under this tier is considered the least reliable for the purposes of this simulation. Yet, if no better source is available in a certain scenario, it may be considered.

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# Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations

Foreign policy, in simple terms, is what your country aims to achieve in regard to the issue at hand or in general with its relations with other countries.

***1. What role must foreign policy play in your research?***

**Understanding the foreign policy of your country must be a checkbox that you tick off at the very beginning of your research.**

Your foreign policy should dictate everything from the arguments you make, the reasoning you give for making those arguments, and the actions you take in the Council.

*2. Where do I look to find foreign policy?*

Most of the time, foreign policy is not explicitly stated. It must be inferred from the actions and statements issued by the country. Reading the meeting records from previous meetings of UNSC (or any other UN body where your country might have spoken on the issue) is a great place to start. If such records are unavailable, look for statements from your country's Foreign Ministry (or equivalent like Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs etcetera) and top leadership (PM, Pres., Secretary of State, Defence Minister).



Foreign Relations on the other hand refers to the diplomatic ties that one country has with another and considers elements such as the mutual presence of embassies, consulates, ambassadors & diplomatic dialogue. More often than not, foreign policy is what will be of your primary concern during the MUN, but it is important to also consider any extremities in your allotted country's foreign relations.

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# The Security Council - An Introduction

The Security Council, the United Nations' principal crisis-management body, is empowered to impose binding obligations on the 193 UN member states to maintain peace. The Security Council's five permanent and ten elected members meet regularly to assess threats to international security, including civil wars, natural disasters, arms proliferation, and terrorism. The Security Council has five permanent members—the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom—collectively known as the P5. Any one of them can veto a resolution. The Security Council's ten elected members, who serve two-year, non-consecutive terms, are not afforded veto power. The Security Council's presidency rotates on a monthly basis, ensuring some agenda-setting influence for its ten non-permanent members, which are elected by a two-thirds vote of the UN General Assembly.

Subsidiary organs that support the Security Council's mission include ad hoc committees on sanctions, counterterrorism, and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Within the UN Secretariat, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Operational Support manage field operations. The Peacebuilding Commission, established in 2005 as a repository of institutional memory and best practices, serves an advisory role.

The Security Council aims to peacefully resolve international disputes in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to call on parties to seek solutions via negotiation, arbitration, or other peaceful means. Failing that, Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to take more assertive actions, such as imposing sanctions or authorizing the use of force "to maintain or restore international peace and security." Peacekeeping missions are the most visible face of the United Nations' conflict-management work; as of 2024, the Security Council oversees eleven operations across three continents, involving a total of more than ninety-seven thousand uniformed personnel. The sanctions provisions in Article 41 of the UN Charter, dormant during much of the Cold War, have become one of the Security Council's most frequently employed tools. As of September 2024, there are fifteen Security Council sanctions regimes, listing more than eight hundred individuals and entities, in place. So-called "smart" sanctions emerged in the mid-1990s as an alternative to what then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called the "blunt instrument" employed in Iraq following the Gulf War. These sanctions target discrete economic and political matters and specific individuals deemed threats to international security. Arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes, and import/export bans on individual goods, rather than comprehensive embargoes, are now the norm.

Under the United Nations Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:

● to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;

● to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;

● to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement; ● to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;

● to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;

● to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;

● to take military action against an aggressor;

● to recommend the admission of new Members;

● to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas"; ● to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.

# Agenda

"Discussing measures to restore peace and security in hotspot regions with prolonged instability with emphasis on the situations in Haiti and Myanmar"

# Part I: Contextualizing the Agenda

**Understanding "Hotspot Regions" in Global Peace and Security**

For the purposes of our committee "hotspot regions" refer to geographic areas where instability is prolonged, multidimensional, and has a tendency to escalate across borders. These regions typically experience recurring cycles of violence, weak governance, economic collapse, or ideological conflict, which not only disrupt internal order but also threaten neighboring states and demand international attention.

A variety of reasons can make a region a hotspot for volatility:
Prolonged instability - the state is unable to assert full territorial control; Spillover effects - instability spills into neighboring states via refugees, arms smuggling, transnational terrorism, or organized crime; Recurring violence - even after peace accords or international intervention, violence tends to reemerge cyclically; Weak regional frameworks - neighboring states or regional multi-lateral bodies lack the capacity or will to collectively respond; High international cost - global actors often intervene due to humanitarian consequences, terrorism risks, or geostrategic interests, but often to no avail and sometimes only to worsen the situation.

There are multiple drivers for prolonged instability, each adapted to the circumstances of its own regions:

1. Fragile states or governments that have limited legitimacy or reach.
2. Ethnic, religious or other identity-based tensions that are often politicized or exploited.
3. Presence of armed non-state actors that hold territory or challenge authority.
4. Recurring or prolonged humanitarian catastrophes such as famine, disease, displacement, etc

5. Shared ethnicity, religion, or trade routes that cause conflicts to jump across borders.
6. Strategic locations such as chokepoints or resource-rich areas with heavy foreign involvement in the past.

**How Instability Spreads: The Contagion Effect**

In today's interconnected world, conflict in one region has a tendency to ripple outward, infecting neighboring areas through a pattern often referred to as the contagion effect. In regions where state capacity is weak and borders are porous, insecurity moves like a virus traveling in the form of weapons, ideology, refugees, and opportunistic armed groups who capitalize on chaos.

A fragile state in the midst of conflict almost always produces pressure points for its neighbors. Refugees pour across borders in search of safety, often faster than host countries can absorb them. Militants may cross into nearby states to regroup, smuggle arms, or tap into new sources of funding and recruitment. And it also has a disastrous economic dimension to it, trade routes collapse, supply chains get disrupted, and cross-border livelihoods are shattered, all of which fuel further instability. Suddenly, a domestic conflict has become a regional crisis.



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*Case Study of Sahel*

The crisis in Mali began in 2012 when a combination of separatist rebels and Islamist militants overran the north of the country, taking advantage of a fragile central government and an influx of weapons following the fall of Libya. While the rebellion initially had local roots, the involvement of groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) quickly transformed the conflict into a transnational security threat.

As French and UN forces intervened to stabilize Mali, armed groups simply relocated to border regions, exploiting porous frontiers and weak neighboring governments. Niger, Burkina Faso, and even parts of northern Cote d'Ivoire began experiencing similar attacks, with extremist networks using remote zones to launch cross-border operations. The violence soon evolved into a regional insurgency, spreading across the Sahel.

Mali thus became the epicenter of a broader regional crisis, not just through direct violence, but also by accelerating arms flows, displacing communities, and undermining governance in the wider Sahel. It should be noted that this crisis in Mali started due to an earlier insurgency in Libya.

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What makes the contagion worse is when regional and international responses are fragmented. Each country may try to fight the flames alone, but without coordination and without tackling the underlying causes. The problem is simply pushed around. Add in the influence of external powers, sometimes backing different factions, and you get a dangerous situation that escalates quickly.

So when the UNSC talks about “hotspot regions,” it’s not just pointing to trouble on a map. It’s acknowledging that unchecked instability does not recognize sovereignty, and that inaction today may mean a wider crisis tomorrow. Understanding this contagion effect is central to any attempt to build peace that lasts, which is where the responsibility to protect, rebuild, and create resilient states becomes not just idealistic, but absolutely strategic and essential.

**Why These Hotspots Persist Chronically**

Some regions seem almost locked in a cycle of instability: conflict breaks out, peace is broken, and then within a few years, things fall apart again. It’s tempting to explain this with short-term factors like failed elections or insurgent attacks, but that isn't deep enough. To truly understand why certain areas

become chronic hotspots, we have to look at the underlying structures that make them so fragile in the first place.

At the core of persistent fragility is a breakdown in the relationship between the state and its people. In many of these regions, the government is either absent, predatory, or viewed as illegitimate by large portions of the population. Whatever be the reason, the consequence is the same, public institutions are weak or captured by elites, and basic services like education, security, and justice don't reach the margins of society. The result is a vacuum and wherever the state withdraws, other actors step in. Sometimes it's armed groups, sometimes it's religious networks or ethnic militias, and occasionally it's organized crime.

But this is not just about governance. Fragility is reinforced by social and geographic fault lines. Ethnic and sectarian divisions, historical grievances, uneven development, and geographic isolation all contribute to a sense of exclusion. In places like the eastern DRC, northern Nigeria, or parts of Syria, entire communities feel like they are on the wrong side of the system, that they are marginalized politically, economically, and culturally. That sense of abandonment festers, and when it combines with economic desperation or violence, the outcome is predictable: instability returns.

External actors often add another layer of complexity. International interventions are sometimes clumsy or short-term, focused more on military goals than sustainable peacebuilding. Foreign funding may flood in for a time, setting up fragile governments, but then disappear once the cameras leave. Worse still, geopolitical rivalries play out inside these hotspots, turning local conflicts into proxy battlegrounds. What could have been resolved internally is now stuck in a wider power contest.

This is why certain hotspots don't just experience conflict, they relapse into it. Unless the structural causes are addressed, the cycle repeats. And that is precisely why, when the Security Council frames these regions as global security threats, it's not merely reacting to violence. It's recognizing that these fragile foundations are part of the international system's blind spots and if ignored, they can send shockwaves far beyond their borders.

**Dimensions of Instability**

Instability within a region rarely emerges from a single source. It is typically the result of multiple overlapping pressures political, economic, social, and environmental that interact and reinforce one another. For any meaningful understanding of hotspot regions, it is essential to dissect the key dimensions of instability and how they fuel insecurity across borders.

*1. Political Instability:*
Fragile governance structures, contested legitimacy, and weak rule of law are often at the core of protracted instability. Countries experiencing regular coups, delayed elections, or rampant corruption tend to lose public trust, creating openings for insurgent groups or external interference.

*2. Security Vacuum and Armed Conflict:*
When national militaries are underfunded, politicized, or stretched too thin, they fail to contain armed non-state actors. Warlords, militias, and terrorist groups often take control of ungoverned spaces, using them as bases for operations. These groups rarely respect borders, especially in regions with ethnic or tribal overlaps across countries. For example, the Lake Chad Basin, where Boko Haram's operations have impacted Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon alike.

*3. Economic Fragility:*
Widespread poverty, unemployment, and unequal resource distribution heighten social tensions and make populations more vulnerable to radicalization. In many cases, economic distress isn't just a symptom of instability, it is a driver. Smuggling, illegal mining, and arms trafficking often flourish in collapsed economies, financing insurgent activity and attracting international criminal networks.

*4. Ethnic and Social Divisions:*
Instability often feeds on deep-seated ethnic, tribal, or sectarian divides. When certain communities feel excluded from governance or economic benefits, it can result in civil strife. These divisions are frequently manipulated by political elites or extremist actors to mobilize violence. In the Central African Republic, for example, ethnic and religious identities have become flashpoints for recurring violence, drawing in foreign mercenaries and regional actors.

*5. Environmental and Climatic Pressures:*
Climate change acts as a threat multiplier by intensifying resource scarcity, especially in agrarian societies. Competition over water, grazing land, or arable soil has played a critical role in conflicts across the Sahel and Horn of Africa. These pressures not only displace people within national borders but also contribute to regional migration crises and food insecurity.

Each of these dimensions rarely exists in isolation. Instead, they intersect to create a volatile landscape that is difficult to stabilize with short-term interventions. Understanding how these forces interact especially in a cross-border context is essential for crafting long-term peace and security frameworks.

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**The Case of CAR**

The Central African Republic has long struggled with weak state institutions, but the tipping point came in 2013 when the Seleka, a coalition of mostly Muslim rebel groups, overthrew the government. In response, largely Christian anti-Balaka militias formed, and the country plunged into sectarian violence. What started as a domestic crisis quickly spilled over into neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as civilians and fighters crossed borders en masse.
CAR's military was fragmented and deeply politicized, unable to contain the uprising. Years of economic underdevelopment and marginalization of northern communities had created deep resentment. Once violence began, it took on ethnic and religious dimensions, which made reconciliation much harder.

The violence displaced hundreds of thousands, many of whom sought refuge in neighboring countries, putting strain on already vulnerable border regions. Rebel groups used border areas as hideouts and supply routes, dragging nearby states into the conflict and leading to retaliatory operations across borders.

There were clearly multiple dimensions involved: Political – collapse of central authority, contested legitimacy; Security – armed militias filling power vacuums; Social/Ethnic – sectarian violence and community-level revenge killings; Economic – competition over diamond-rich zones and arms smuggling; Regional – refugee flow, regional militia activity, and external interventions.

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**The Case of Somalia and the Horn of Africa**

Somalia's breakdown started in the early 1990s with the collapse of the central government. Warlords and later Islamist militant groups like Al-Shabaab took over different regions. The prolonged absence of a unified government allowed non-state actors to grow powerful, turning Somalia into a hub for arms trafficking, piracy, and extremist recruitment.

Years of dictatorship had hollowed out institutions. After the collapse, foreign interventions came with limited understanding of clan dynamics. A failure to build inclusive governance and restore basic services created space for violent groups to gain legitimacy by providing rudimentary order.

Al-Shabaab's operations now extend into Kenya and Ethiopia, with attacks on Kenyan malls, buses, and schools becoming tragically frequent. Somali piracy disrupted international shipping routes, drawing in foreign naval patrols. Refugee flows from Somalia also put pressure on camps in Kenya and Djibouti.

There were clearly multiple dimensions involved: Political – total collapse of governance; Security – militant groups and piracy; Economic – reliance on illicit economies, famine, and foreign remittances; Social – clan rivalries and youth disenfranchisement; Environmental – drought and famine exacerbating displacement; Regional – cross-border terrorism and international maritime disruption.

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**UN Intervention**

The United Nations has played a multifaceted role in the Sahel, intervening through peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations, and post-conflict development programs. These interventions have aimed not only to halt violence but to stabilize fragile states, provide emergency health services, and assist in rebuilding systems broken by prolonged instability. However, the nature of the Sahel's conflicts cross-border, asymmetrical, and deeply rooted in governance failures has often placed these interventions under severe strain.

UN operations in the region can broadly be categorized into the following:

- **Peacekeeping Missions**, such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which has focused on protecting civilians, supporting political processes, and helping restore state authority.

- **Special Political Missions**, which aim to mediate conflicts and advise on governance, like the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS).

- **Humanitarian Assistance**, delivered by agencies like WHO, UNICEF, and WFP, particularly in response to displacement, famine, and the collapse of basic services.

- **Post-Conflict Recovery and Development Programs**, often conducted in partnership with the World Bank and regional actors, targeting long-term resilience in healthcare, education, and governance.

Despite the scale of these efforts, outcomes have been mixed. One of the most persistent challenges lies in the mismatch between mandates and the complexity on the ground. Missions like MINUSMA, for instance, were deployed in environments where insurgents used guerrilla tactics and IEDs, yet the peacekeepers lacked the equipment, coordination, or rules of engagement to counter such threats effectively. Meanwhile, local communities frequently viewed the mission as ineffective or disconnected from their everyday realities.

One of the more fundamental challenges has been the absence of a unified strategy. UN health missions often work separately from security and governance interventions, leading to fragmented impact. In areas where hospitals are rebuilt but security remains elusive, or where food aid is delivered without addressing local tensions, interventions become stopgaps rather than sustainable solutions. Additionally, the UN's dependence on host governments has complicated its ability to operate impartially particularly when governments themselves are actors in the conflict or have low legitimacy.

Perhaps most significantly, UN efforts have not been able to prevent the regional spillover of instability. Without regional coordination and long-term investment in governance, interventions in one state often end up pushing the problem next door.

Nonetheless, UN presence has brought valuable lessons. Integrated approaches linking healthcare with conflict prevention and institution-building have shown more promise. Partnerships with local NGOs, community leaders, and even traditional health providers have improved the credibility and reach of aid. These insights point to a crucial takeaway: for the UN to make a lasting impact in the Sahel, it must move beyond siloed mandates and embrace more adaptive, context-sensitive strategies that are firmly grounded in local realities.

More critically, UN interventions should focus on sustainable transformation rather than temporary stabilization. It is important to sufficiently address the root causes of instability such as youth unemployment, political exclusion, or local grievances against state forces.

# Part II - The Situation in Myanmar

**Background**

Since gaining independence, Myanmar has faced persistent challenges with respect to military dominance, civil unrest, political instability and widespread poverty. In 2021, when a military coup was conducted, the hopes of a better and a democratic future were crushed.

The coup led the country into a new phase of intense violence and dominance. The military is now fighting the long-standing ethnic armed groups and newly formed civilian militias. In response, ousted lawmakers and activists created a parallel government—the National Unity Government (NUG)—which declared war on the junta and formed the armed People's Defence Force (PDF). The military responded with brutal crackdowns, including shootings, arrests, and village burnings, killing at least 1,500 people and detaining over 8,000.

Economically, the coup devastated Myanmar, shrinking its economy by nearly 20% in 2021, collapsing the healthcare system during COVID-19, and forcing millions into hunger and displacement.

By early 2022, armed resistance had spread to areas historically untouched by conflict, including central cities like Mandalay and Yangon. Analysts suggest the military is struggling to maintain control, and the conflict is likely to grow more violent and prolonged. Some experts believe the opposition may gain significant territorial control if current trends continue.

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**Implication of Military Takeover and Myanmar's diversity**

Myanmar is an ethnically diverse nation, officially recognizing over a hundred ethnic groups. The Bamar, or ethnic Burmans, make up about two-thirds of the population and have historically dominated government and military roles. In contrast, ethnic minorities have long faced systemic marginalization, including limited economic development in their regions, underrepresentation in governance, and frequent military abuses. These deep-rooted

divisions—originating during British colonial rule—have sparked decades-long armed conflicts involving the Tatmadaw and numerous ethnic armed groups, forming what some consider the world's longest-running civil war.

After independence, many ethnic groups took up arms to demand greater autonomy, and tensions worsened following the 1962 military coup, which further suppressed minority rights and used brutal tactics against resistance groups. Recent clashes have also involved competition over natural resources and control of illegal trades like gem mining and narcotics.

Before the 2021 coup, most fighting was confined to Myanmar's border regions. Key groups opposing the government include the Karen National Liberation Army, the Kachin Independence Army, and the Shan State Army. The conflicts have claimed tens of thousands of lives, with watchdogs regularly reporting severe human rights violations by the military, including killings, torture, forced labor, sexual violence, and the recruitment of child soldiers.

Even before the 2021 coup, over a million people had fled the country, while hundreds of thousands remained internally displaced. Among the most persecuted are the Rohingya, a mostly Muslim minority subjected to systematic repression for decades. In 2016 and 2017, the military launched a brutal crackdown against them, leading to mass killings and the destruction of villages. UN officials and rights organizations believe this may amount to genocide. In 2019, Gambia brought Myanmar before the International Court of Justice for violating the Genocide Convention. Both the military and Aung San Suu Kyi's civilian government denied these allegations, with Suu Kyi personally defending the military in court. A final decision on the case could take years, though initial objections by the junta were expected in early 2022. Most Rohingya now live in overcrowded refugee camps in Bangladesh, which continues to press for their return, though repatriation efforts have stalled since the coup.

The military takeover also disrupted the fragile peace talks led by Suu Kyi's government. Most ethnic armed groups oppose the junta, with many aligning with the National Unity Government (NUG), while some focus on consolidating their regional control—occasionally clashing with each other.

Read more about the present day impact here:
https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1159561

## Recent Developments

Despite retaining technological advantages, Myanmar's military has struggled to counter rebel advances, losing strategic areas and facing growing economic and humanitarian crises. In response to a severe manpower shortage, the junta introduced forced conscription in early 2024, sparking mass youth migration from urban centers.

Rebel groups have made significant gains: the Three Brotherhood Alliance captured the crucial Lashio military command in the northeast, while the Arakan Army secured control over parts of Rakhine State—raising concerns about renewed ethnic persecution, particularly of the Rohingya.

Support for the National Unity Government (NUG) has surged domestically, with a 2024 survey showing 93% approval among citizens. The junta, meanwhile, has extended emergency rule and announced elections for late 2025 or early 2026, which analysts fear may deepen unrest.

China has become increasingly involved, mediating ceasefires and seeking stability to protect its economic and strategic interests in Myanmar, including key infrastructure and trade routes. While Beijing supports the military regime, it also keeps diplomatic channels open with the NLD.

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## UN & Diplomatic Efforts in Myanmar

### 1. Diplomatic Efforts & Condemnation

The United Nations has taken a strong diplomatic stance against the military coup in Myanmar, particularly through the UN General Assembly and the Secretary-General's office. In June 2021, the General Assembly passed a significant but non-binding resolution that condemned the coup, urged the restoration of democratic governance, and called upon member states to halt

arms sales to the junta. Although this resolution reflected widespread international disapproval, it lacked enforcement power. Within the UN Security Council, discussions about Myanmar have been frequent, yet action has been hampered by veto powers held by **China and Russia**, who have historically shielded the Myanmar military from sanctions and stronger resolutions. Additionally, the appointment of **UN Special Envoys**, such as Noeleen Heyzer, was intended to open channels of communication and promote dialogue among stakeholders. However, repeated refusals by the junta to engage meaningfully with the UN have rendered these efforts largely ineffective.

**2. Human Rights Monitoring**

The United Nations has played a critical role in documenting human rights violations in Myanmar, especially since the military seized power in 2021. Through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Council, the UN has released detailed reports outlining extensive abuses by the Tatmadaw, including extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, sexual violence, and the use of child soldiers. These findings are based on verified testimonies and satellite imagery, offering credible evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The reports not only serve to inform the international community but also help lay the groundwork for future accountability and justice mechanisms. However, the military regime has consistently denied these allegations and barred UN investigators from entering conflict zones, complicating the process of data collection and monitoring.

**3. Rohingya Crisis and Genocide Proceedings**

The UN has been deeply involved in addressing the long-standing persecution of the **Rohingya**, a stateless Muslim minority group that has suffered decades of discrimination in Myanmar. The 2016–2017 military crackdown led to the mass displacement of over 700,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh, where they now live in overcrowded refugee camps. In response to the atrocities, the UN set up the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) to collect and preserve evidence of international crimes. Further, in 2019, The Gambia filed a case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under the

Genocide Convention, accusing the state of attempting to destroy the Rohingya population. The proceedings are ongoing, and while the court has issued provisional measures ordering Myanmar to protect the Rohingya, the junta's compliance remains questionable. Notably, Aung San Suu Kyi, then Myanmar's de facto civilian leader, defended the military's actions at The Hague, drawing international criticism. The UN continues to support justice efforts while providing humanitarian assistance through agencies like UNHCR and WFP in Bangladesh.

**4. Humanitarian Assistance**

Despite operational hurdles, UN agencies have remained essential in providing humanitarian support across Myanmar and in neighboring countries hosting refugees. Organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and UNHCR have delivered aid in the form of food, medicine, clean water, education, and shelter. However, the military regime has imposed strict restrictions on access, especially in opposition-held territories and ethnic minority areas. As a result, millions of civilians remain beyond the reach of international assistance. The humanitarian crisis has worsened due to ongoing armed conflict, economic collapse, and natural disasters, with the UN estimating that over **18 million people in Myanmar** are in urgent need of aid in 2025. Compounding these challenges is a severe funding gap, with UN agencies often operating under resource constraints. Nonetheless, the UN continues to advocate for humanitarian corridors and increased donor support to prevent further deterioration.

**5. Challenges to UN Intervention**

The UN's ability to intervene meaningfully in Myanmar is severely constrained by political, legal, and practical obstacles. Chief among these is the lack of consensus in the UN Security Council, where China and Russia have consistently blocked efforts to impose binding sanctions or authorize peacekeeping missions. Both countries have strategic interests in Myanmar and view external intervention as a violation of sovereignty. Myanmar's junta also refuses to recognize or cooperate with international mechanisms, rejecting UN

resolutions and denying access to humanitarian workers and investigators. Meanwhile, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), supported by the UN, proposed a Five-Point Consensus in 2021, which called for dialogue and cessation of violence, but the junta has largely ignored these terms. The fragmentation among ethnic armed groups, growing violence, and lack of a unified resistance strategy further complicate efforts. Ultimately, without stronger geopolitical consensus and cooperation from regional powers, the UN remains limited in its capacity to enforce change or halt the conflict.

# Part III - The Situation in Haiti

## A Timeline of Haiti

Haiti's descent into fragility has been a product of systemic institutional erosion, elite political deadlock, external miscalculations, and increasingly the domination of non-state actors.

*1986–2004: Post-Duvalier Political Volatility and International Entrenchment*

1986: Fall of Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier ends a 29-year family dictatorship. This creates a power vacuum and sets off a cycle of coups, weak transitional governments, and failed democratic experiments.

1991 & 2004: Twice-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide is overthrown by coups. In both instances, his return or removal is heavily shaped by U.S. and French foreign policy, deepening popular skepticism toward foreign intervention.

2004: The UN establishes the *United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)* to reimpose order. It remains until 2017.

*2010–2016: Earthquake, Cholera, and Electoral Dysfunction*

January 2010: A 7.0 magnitude earthquake kills over 200,000. While billions in aid are pledged, recovery is slow, uncoordinated, and centralized around foreign NGOs rather than the Haitian state.

October 2010: Nepalese UN peacekeepers introduce cholera through improper waste management. This triggers an epidemic that kills more than 10,000 and infects hundreds of thousands. The UN acknowledges responsibility only in 2016.

2015–16: Highly contested elections are marred by fraud allegations. After postponements and reruns, Jovenel Moïse is elected President, beginning a polarizing tenure.

*2017–2020: Dismantling of Institutions*

2017–2019: Moïse's administration is dogged by corruption scandals. Mass protests paralyze Port-au-Prince multiple times.

2020: Moïse dissolves Parliament after elections are not held. He rules by decree, triggering constitutional disputes. The judiciary and other accountability bodies are weakened or sidelined. Elections are not organized for key positions, including municipal posts.

*2021–2022: Assassination, Power Vacuum, and Gang Expansion*

July 7, 2021: President Jovenel Moïse is assassinated in his residence by a foreign-mercenary-led unit. No elected successor is in place. Interim Prime Minister Ariel Henry assumes power, but legitimacy is widely contested.

2022: With no functional parliament or elections, Henry continues to rule by decree. Armed gangs exploit the vacuum, many establish control over key highways, ports, and entire neighborhoods. The Haitian National Police (HNP), under-resourced and poorly trained, begins to lose turf.

*2023–2024: Full State Erosion and Security Collapse*

Late 2022 – 2023: Gang coalitions like *G9 an Fanmi e Alye* and *G-Pep* control 60%–80% of Port-au-Prince. They engage in strategic sieges, kidnapping, and attacks on police stations.

February 2023: Ariel Henry formally requests an international security assistance mission. Initial resistance from the Haitian diaspora and civil society

delays action.

October 2023: The UN Security Council passes **Resolution 2699**, authorizing a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission led by Kenya.

Late 2023 – Early 2024: Kenyan deployment is delayed by legal challenges and domestic opposition in Nairobi. As a result, the situation in Haiti deteriorates further: major hospitals shut down, ports are blockaded, and gang attacks become indiscriminate.

*2024–2025: Haiti as a "Non-Governed Space"*

Early 2024: Coordinated gang offensives push into Carrefour, Pétion-Ville, and even near the National Palace. Police stations are raided, officers executed, and weapons looted.

March 2024: Ariel Henry is forced to resign under pressure. A Presidential Transitional Council (PTC) is formed, but it lacks enforcement capacity and political consensus.

Mid-2024 to 2025: Gangs intensify turf wars. Notably:
*G9* consolidated its hold on western Port-au-Prince.
*G-Pep* controls eastern routes and extorts customs revenues.
*Kraze Baryè*, *400 Mawozo*, and *Base 5 Segonn* engage in high-profile kidnappings and sieges.

2025: While the Kenyan-led MSS has begun limited deployments, progress is slow. The Haitian National Police is fractured, the judicial system is non-functional, and public trust in both domestic and international actors remains extremely low.

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**Political and Institutional Breakdown**

Haiti's current political paralysis is rooted in decades of institutional decay, worsened by leadership vacuums and systemic corruption. The assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 triggered a full-scale collapse of central authority. Even before his death, Haiti's legislative branch had ceased functioning in early 2020 due to delayed elections, leaving the president to rule by decree. After Moïse's assassination, Ariel Henry was appointed prime minister amidst considerable controversy, lacking broad legitimacy and facing pushback from opposition figures and civil society alike.

The judiciary has similarly eroded, plagued by political interference and underfunding. Courts are barely functioning, and judges have often fled their posts due to threats from gangs. Corruption within state institutions is widely prevalent. Public offices are frequently captured by political patrons who use them to enrich themselves or secure favors, rather than serve the population.

Perhaps most critically, the Haitian National Police (HNP) has been outgunned and overwhelmed. Years of poor training, underpayment, and attrition have left the force unfit to address the scale of violence posed by well-armed gangs. The HNP has often relied on controversial foreign assistance or private actors, blurring the line between state and non-state enforcement. Reports have surfaced of police officers colluding with certain gang networks, either out of fear, financial incentive, or ethnic/political alignment.

International actors like the United States, the OAS, and the Core Group have played contradictory roles. While calling for free and fair elections, they've simultaneously backed figures with little domestic legitimacy, contributing to public distrust. The UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) has also faced criticism for focusing too heavily on technical support and state-building without addressing the urgent need for security and accountability.

The result is a hollowed-out state where basic services like healthcare, education, and sanitation have either been taken over by NGOs or left entirely to local communities. The government exists more as a legal abstraction than a functioning authority, with meaningful control ceding increasingly to criminal networks and vigilante groups.

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## Gang Dominance and Territorial Control in Haiti

The rapid deterioration of state authority in Haiti has created fertile ground for armed gangs to evolve into powerful quasi-political actors. These groups now exert control over large swathes of Port-au-Prince and surrounding regions, often acting as de facto authorities.

The gang landscape in Haiti is fluid, but as of mid-2025, it is largely dominated by two rival coalitions:

### 1. G9 an Fanmi e Alye ("G9 and Family and Allies")

Formation & Background: Founded in June 2020 by Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier, a former police officer and self-declared revolutionary. G9 was initially a federation of nine gangs operating mainly in Port-au-Prince's slums.

Political Ties: The G9 has long been suspected of having ties with elements of the former ruling party (PHTK), and Chérizier often frames his movement as an anti-elite, pro-poor revolution. Critics argue this is a facade to mask violent repression and territorial ambition.

Operations: G9 controls neighborhoods such as Delmas, La Saline, Cité Soleil, and Bas-Delmas. Their dominance over these regions allows control over key roads and choke points into the capital.

Tactics: Extortion, arson, massacres, and road blockades are common. G9 also has elements of social service provision, food distribution, and local justice in areas it controls.

### 2. G-Pep

Formation & Identity: This is a loosely affiliated group of anti-G9 gangs, emerging around 2021–2022 to challenge G9's dominance. Unlike the G9, G-Pep is less centralized and more ideologically diverse.

Prominent Leaders & Gangs: Includes gangs like "Kraze Baryè" led by Vitel'homme Innocent, and "400 Mawozo" led by Wilson Joseph ("Lanmò Sanjou"), infamous for high-profile kidnappings including those of U.S. missionaries.

Territories: G-Pep-aligned groups control areas such as Croix-des-Bouquets, Martissant, and parts of Petion-Ville. Their control of northern and eastern routes into the capital gives them significant leverage over supply chains.

Criminal Activity: G-Pep gangs are particularly known for mass kidnappings, extortion of businesses, and violent attacks on rival strongholds. They lack the centralized propaganda of G9 but are equally brutal.

Another interesting activity to be noted is the start of a vigilante movement in 2024 called **"Bwa Kale"**, a popular uprising against gangs. Citizens across urban slums and rural peripheries begin executing suspected gang members. This both undermined gang power and sparked brutal retaliation. Gangs, though under pressure from Bwa Kale and UN-backed security initiatives, remain entrenched. Alliances shift frequently, some G9 factions defect to G-Pèp; smaller gangs realign or merge for survival. Violence becomes more unpredictable and decentralized.

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**International Response and Foreign Intervention**

The international community's response to Haiti's deteriorating security and governance situation has been characterized by hesitation, fragmentation, and criticism. Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 and the rapid escalation of gang violence, global actors initially limited themselves to statements of concern and ad hoc humanitarian support. The United Nations issued multiple calls urging restraint and dialogue but refrained from direct intervention, largely constrained by its prior legacy in the country particularly the lingering resentment stemming from the cholera outbreak introduced by UN peacekeepers during the MINUSTAH mission (2004–2017). Meanwhile, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and CARICOM voiced concern but struggled to coordinate any tangible action.

By late 2022 and into 2023, with violence peaking in Port-au-Prince and state structures collapsing further, the conversation around foreign intervention was reignited. However, traditional Western actors like the United States, France, and Canada were reluctant to lead a new mission themselves. This hesitation stemmed from political fatigue, domestic opposition to foreign deployments, and reputational concerns tied to earlier interventions. Canada and the U.S. instead focused on sanctioning Haitian elites allegedly involved in gang financing, while providing logistical support to humanitarian agencies. Washington, in particular, pushed for a "Haitian-led solution" even as the government in Port-au-Prince increasingly lost the ability to govern.

In mid-2023, momentum began to build for the formation of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission, a non-UN peace enforcement mission authorized by the UN Security Council but not directly under its command. Kenya unexpectedly volunteered to lead the mission, proposing to send around 1,000 police officers to help stabilize key infrastructure and support the Haitian National Police (HNP). The U.S. pledged over $200 million in logistical and financial backing, with other countries like The Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, and even some African nations offering to contribute personnel or material.

The deployment of the MSS faced significant delays. In early 2024, Kenya's High Court temporarily blocked the mission, arguing that it violated Kenyan law. This decision led to diplomatic tensions and cast doubt on the mission's future. However, after political maneuvering and legal adjustments, the Kenyan parliament gave its approval, and by early 2025, the first Kenyan police units began arriving in Haiti. Their arrival was met with mixed reactions, while some segments of the Haitian population viewed the mission as a necessary step toward restoring order, others protested what they perceived as another iteration of foreign meddling, echoing Haiti's long and painful history of occupation and dependency.

Critics have pointed out several challenges facing the MSS mission. Unlike a traditional UN peacekeeping force, the MSS lacks a clear, enforceable mandate and is not backed by a long-standing institutional framework. Questions remain about rules of engagement, the capacity of MSS troops to operate in hostile urban terrain, and the risk of escalating violence in gang-controlled zones. The mission's limited scope, focusing primarily on protecting key infrastructure like

airports and ports, also leaves vast portions of the population unprotected. Furthermore, the Haitian National Police remains critically under-resourced, poorly trained, and frequently infiltrated by gang sympathizers.

Beyond the MSS, international responses have been fragmented. The Dominican Republic (Haiti's only land neighbor) closed its borders multiple times, built fortified fences, and implemented mass deportations of Haitian refugees, drawing condemnation from human rights organizations. Cuba continued its long-standing policy of sending medical brigades to underserved areas but lacked broader capacity to engage in security matters. International NGOs and UN agencies, including the World Food Programme, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), and the ICRC, have struggled to operate in gang-dominated zones, often forced to pay unofficial "taxes" to secure access or abandon missions due to staff safety concerns.

In 2025, despite renewed international attention, the situation remains deeply precarious. The MSS presence is symbolically important but not yet transformational. Without a coordinated long-term strategy to rebuild political institutions, disarm gangs, and reestablish the Haitian state's monopoly on force, foreign intervention risks becoming a temporary patch on a deeply entrenched crisis.

**Questions to be considered:**

1. What mechanisms can be used to restore legitimate governance in countries like Haiti and Myanmar where democratic institutions have collapsed or been undermined?

2. How can the international community balance pressure and engagement with de facto authorities or military regimes without legitimizing them?

3. What reforms or mandates are needed to **strengthen the UN's ability to intervene effectively** in internal conflicts without violating national sovereignty?

4. What are the **underlying drivers of prolonged instability** in Haiti and Myanmar—such as corruption, ethnic exclusion, inequality, or weak state institutions—and how should these be addressed in policy?

5. How can **inclusive economic development** be promoted in conflict-affected areas to support long-term peacebuilding?

**Resources:**

- https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16091.doc.htm
- https://www.wfp.org/news/fao-and-wfp-early-warning-report-reveals-worsening-hunger-13-hotspots-five-immediate-risk
- https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/voices/finding-a-path-to-peace-stability-and-development-in-haiti
- https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/peace-and-security
- https://www.unwomen.org/en/articles/facts-and-figures/facts-and-figures-women-peace-and-security
- https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3938576/files/SG_Report_-_THE_STATE_OF_GLOBAL_PEACE_and_SECURITY_0.pdf
- https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/goodpracticenote.cs-pb-sp.220510.v6.final_.web-compressed.pdf